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ABSTRACT 
The use of export restrictions has become more and more common in recent years, 
evidencing the substantial loopholes existing in the WTO regulation on the matter. 
As a result of this deficient legal framework, the WTO membership experiences 
important losses of welfare and increasing political tensions. The multilateral 
negotiations for an updated discipline on export restrictions, in the context of the 
Doha Development Round, are blocked. Consequently, members have established a 
set of preferential bilateral and multilateral agreements to relieve the negative 
effects of these measures. Likewise, some recent WTO members have committed to 
stricter regulations as part of their Accession Protocols. Nevertheless, these methods 
have evidenced some important flaws, and the multilateral scene remains the 
optimum forum to address export restrictions. This Working Paper proposes a 
number of measures to improve the legal framework of the quantitative export 
restrictions and export duties, as well as their notification procedures.  
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1 Introduction 
The regulatory framework of export restrictions in the WTO is clearly insufficient and it 
is not prepared to address the needs of the current international trading system. 
 
Export restrictions have become increasingly important in the recent years as their 
application has become widespread, and have thus found their way onto the global 
agenda.  Furthermore, the issue has recently received broad public attention due to the 
China – Raw Materials case, a WTO dispute settlement process concluded in 2012 that 
examined the complaints brought by the EU, the US and Mexico regarding China’s 
export restriction policies. 
 
The result of the existing lack of regulation is a sub-optimal status quo which causes 
important losses of efficiency and diminishes global welfare. Furthermore, it distorts 
international prices, undermining traders’ confidence in the world trading system and 
increasing price volatility. 
 
Without a decided reform of the multilateral legal framework, this situation will 
continue to deteriorate in the coming years due to the increasing scarcity of basic 
resources. A group of WTO members, including most developed countries, has 
supported the establishment of a stricter regulation. This position has been opposed 
by a number of developing countries, which perceive export restrictions as a valid 
instrument for development. 
 
This Working Paper analyses the existing WTO legal framework, as well as the different 
alternatives proposed in preferential trade agreements and the Doha Development 
Round, in order to suggest a reform proposal that aims to configure a feasible and 
more efficient framework. 
 
To this end, this paper is organised as follows: part one examines the main forms in 
which export restrictions are applied, as well as their economic effects. Part two 
illustrates the more common policy objectives pursued by countries when imposing 
export restrictions. Part three studies the principal WTO provisions that discipline 
export restrictions, namely Articles II, XI, XX and XI GATT and the relevant articles of a 
reduced number of Accession Protocols. Moreover, it reviews the most interesting 
legislative solutions proposed in preferential trade agreements and the Doha 
Development Round. The final part offers a reform proposal on the basis of the 
described background. 
 
2 Main Forms of Export Restrictions 
An export restriction is any sort of border measure imposed by a national government 
that limits or complicates the export of goods. The US - Export Restraints case offers 
the most complete definition of an export restriction: “a border measure that takes the 
form of a government law or regulation which expressly limits the quantity of exports 
or places explicit conditions on the circumstances under which exports are permitted, 
or that takes the form of a government-imposed fee or tax on exports of the product 
calculated to limit the quantity of exports”1. From this definition is possible to establish 
three main categories, which in turn may contain different subcategories and measures 
with similar effect. 
 
Part one of this Working Paper studies the main characteristics of quantitative 
restraints, export licenses and export duties.  
                                                
1 Report of the Panel. US - Export Restraints, p. 95. 
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2.1. Quantitative Restraints 
 
The Panel in the US – Export Restraints case refers to measures “which expressly 
limit the quantity of exports”. The most rigorous kind of quantitative restraint is 
the prohibition. Likewise, quantitative limits are frequently imposed through 
export quotas, which establish ceilings for the total amount traded of a particular 
product. Quantitative restraints are the most harmful barriers for commerce 
because they encourage arbitrary and un-transparent behaviour. 
 
In addition, governments can negatively affect trade by means of fixing a threshold 
price. According to WTO case law2, a minimum export price has equivalent effect to 
a quantitative restriction and therefore is prohibited under Article XI:1 GATT. 
Therefore, minimum export prices may also fall under this category. 
 
2.2. Export Licenses 
 
Export licenses are defined by the Panel as an obstacle which “places explicit 
conditions on the circumstances under which exports are permitted”. They 
establish the submission of some documentation as a requirement for the export 
of products. Licensing can be automatic, attending informative purposes 
exclusively, or non-automatic. The latter group is the most conflictive and can get 
to be as restrictive and opaque as quantitative restrictions.3 The Panel in Japan – 
Semiconductors was categorical in considering that licensing practices by Japan, 
leading to delays of up to three months, were inconsistent with Article XI:1 GATT. 4 
 
State owned exportation monopolies are a very restrictive form of licensing. These 
public companies enjoy total exclusivity over the international sales of a product, 
controlling thus the export price.5 The Note Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVIII is 
straightforward when it provides that “the terms “import restrictions” or “export 
restrictions” include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations”6. 
 
2.3. Export Duties 
 
Lastly, the Panel describes as an export duty any measure “that takes the form of a 
government-imposed fee or tax on exports of the product calculated to limit the 
quantity of exports”. These charges modify export prices, setting lower prices for 
the national market. Measures like the reduction of VAT rebates are considered to 
produce similar effects.7 
 
Export restrictions should not be mistaken for export fees as defined by Article VIII 
of the GATT, which are paid against a provided service. 
 
In some cases, punitive levels of export duties can have similar effect as a 
quantitative restriction.8 In other words, export taxes and export quantitative 
restrictions are generally substitutable policy tools. As an example, Argentina used 
high levels of export duties in order to tackle foreign sales of cereal, achieving a 
de facto ban on exports.9 Additionally, the WTO case law has explained that, in 
some specific occasions, quantitative restrictions and export duties can also have 
supplementary functions.10 
 
                                                
2 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 266. 
3 Kim 2010, p. 6. 
4 Report of the Panel. Japan – Semiconductors, p. 31. 
5 Korinek and Bartos 2012, p. 7. 
6 Note Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVIII. GATT 1947. 
7 Kim 2010, p. 6. 
8 Sharma 2011, p. 21. 
9 Blas 2010. 
10 Kim 2010, p. 15. 
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3 Overview of the Different Policy Objectives 
Export restrictions, either in the form of quantitative limitations or duties, can be an 
important instrument for the development of commercial policies. However, they can 
also provoke domestic and global welfare losses by inducing excessive production in 
less competitive industries. Furthermore, they may generate beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies, which in turn lead to retaliatory responses by other countries and political 
instability.11 
 
Part two identifies the main motivations for the use of export restrictions and explains 
their effect on the development of international trade. 
 
3.1. Improve the Terms-of-Trade 
 
The overall effects of export restrictions are a reduction in the volume of 
international trade and a global loss of efficiency. However, a country that controls 
a large share of the world supply of a particular good can use export duties to 
improve its terms-of-trade. That is to say, to increase the value of its exports in 
front of the value of its imports. The imposition of an export tax on a commodity 
by a large exporter will increase the world price of the referred product, and will 
consequently improve the country’s terms-of-trade.12 Nevertheless, this practice 
has a negative effect on the welfare of importers and is likely to trigger similar 
behaviour in other countries.13 
 
This strategy has proved to be more effective when applied by countries with a 
certain degree of monopolistic power in the international market of a specific 
product which has highly inelastic demand. The case of rare earths, produced 
mainly by China and submitted to export quotas, is an illustrative example.14 
 
3.2. Increase Tax Revenue through Export Duties 
 
Traditionally, taxes collected through export duties are an important source of 
income for developing countries, which usually are very dependent on the 
production of primary products. In many occasions, developing countries have 
weak institutions that cannot collect domestic taxes effectively. Therefore, taxing 
the export of products instead of their production may become an easier way to 
ensure a source of public income. However, export taxes have the shortcoming of 
being highly unstable. A strong dependence on this source of income can make 
developing countries vulnerable to volatile revenue levels, becoming thus a big 
obstacle for development.15 
 
Nevertheless, this pattern is changing and the weight of export taxes over the total 
revenue is declining in many countries. A notable exception is Argentina, where 
income from exports grew from levels close to zero before the 2001 economic 
crisis to 9.9% of the total public revenue in the period 2002-2005.16 
 
3.3. Promoting Downstream Industries 
 
Export restrictions on a particular good can drive national prices downwards, 
conferring thus a benefit to the local industry that uses this product as an input. 
Consequently, some developing countries consider them useful tools for economic 
development and have, following the premises of the “infant industry” argument, 
                                                
11 Mandelson 2008. 
12 Piermartini 2004, p. 7. 
13 Piermartini 2004, p. 8. 
14 Korinek and Kim 2010, p. 19.!
15 Piermartini 2004, p. 14. 
16 Kim 2010, p. 9. 
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established export restrictions on unprocessed goods.17 These restrictions work as 
an indirect subsidy for the local processing industry, keeping domestic prices 
lower than the international ones.18 The final objective of this practice is to 
increase the added value of the national production. 
 
However, the use of export restrictions to develop “infant industries” also has 
some drawbacks. The industries developed under this protection may become 
dependent on the export restriction, remaining less productive than their foreign 
counterparts and generating efficiency losses.19 
 
3.4. Response to Tariff Escalation in Export Markets 
 
Export restrictions in the form of export taxes can be established as a response to 
tariff escalation in the destination markets. Tariff escalation is the practice of 
levying higher duties on the import of processed products than on raw materials.20 
The use of tariff escalation strategies in developed countries encourages the 
import of raw commodities into these countries. Consequently, it may hinder the 
development of processing industries in developing countries. Imposing 
differential export rates may thus be a valid response to offset the distortionary 
effect generated by tariff escalation.21 
 
Nevertheless, differential export taxes can also have undesired redistributive 
effects. An export tax on a primary product can increase income inequality within a 
country by redistributing welfare from the primary sector, which employs unskilled 
workers intensively, to the secondary sector, and therefore harming the most 
vulnerable parts of the population.22 
 
3.5. Control of National Prices 
 
A rise in the international prices of an essential product can lead to inflationary 
pressures in national prices and consequently cause an enormous loss of welfare 
in a country. As a result, guaranteeing the price stability and the effective supply 
of foodstuffs and other essential products is one of the most important policy 
objectives for governments. Local authorities tend to restrain the export of goods 
when faced with a situation of global or local scarcity, trying to ensure supplies for 
their domestic markets. In this same vein, Article XI GATT provides in its second 
paragraph an exception for this sort of situations. 
 
However, such measures, when applied by a large producer, may harm the position 
of the net-importer countries by reducing the supply to the world market, and can 
thus trigger further increases in international prices.23 
 
3.6. Environmental Protection 
 
The fast and unsustainable depletion of exhaustible resources, e.g. minerals, logs 
or hydrocarbons, can cause environmental degradation. Thus, national 
governments may try to curb these economic activities by means of export 
restrictions. This practice has led to numerous disputes in the WTO and is mainly 
regulated in Article XX GATT. 
 
However, the use of export restraints does not always conduce to achieve the 
intended environmental objectives.24 Without the corresponding measures to limit 
                                                
17 Kim 2010, p. 10. 
18 Piermartini 2004, p. 11. 
19 Piermartini 2004, p. 12. 
20 Mitra and Josling 2009, p. 9. 
21 Piermartini 2004, p. 13. 
22 Piermartini 2004, p. 12. 
23 Kim 2010, p. 11. 
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national consumption, an export restrain may encourage the local demand and 
result in similar or bigger volumes of production.25 
 
On the other hand, countries with weak administrative capacities are more capable 
of taxing trade outflows, which can be conveniently monitored at the border, than 
to control domestic production and consumption. In these situations, the 
implementation of production taxes may encourage local companies to operate in 
the informal sector and evade taxes. Therefore it is more appropriate to enforce a 
limitation on the production of a particular product by means of an export 
restriction.26 
 
4 Regulation of Export Restrictions 
Export restrictions are regulated in the WTO Agreements and Accession Protocols, 
which provide the legal framework for the international trading system. Likewise, these 
measures have been the object of an intense discussion in the context of the Doha 
Developing Round. 
 
Part three of this Working Paper reviews the relevant norms affecting export 
restrictions, as well as the different alternatives proposed for their regulation. 
 
4.1. Export Restrictions in WTO Law 
 
Different articles address export restrictions in WTO law, in particular Articles XI 
and XIII GATT and Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and arguably Article 
II GATT. 
 
Despite the fact that the treaties refer to export restrictions, the system evidences 
a lack of adequate and more specific regulation. In the first place, Article XI 
establishes a general prohibition of quantitative restrictions to trade, referring 
both to imports and exports. However, its wording is vague and leaves wide 
margin for interpretation. Secondly, Article II GATT constrains tariffs to the levels 
agreed on the schedules. However, there are no substantial commitments for 
export duties in these schedules. 
 
The regulation of the licensing procedures is another field where the difference 
between the regulation of imports and exports is evident. While exports only fall 
under the general provisions of Articles VIII and X GATT, imports licensing rules 
are extensively disciplined in the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.27 
 
Pascal Lamy, the Director General of the WTO noted in 2011 that “[i]t is certainly 
true that there is an imbalance in the WTO rule-book between the stringency of the 
rules for imports and their laxity for exports”28. 
 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that export tariffs are governed by the principle of 
Most Favoured Nation formulated in Article I GATT, and subjected to the National 
Treatment obligation of Article III GATT and to the non-discrimination obligation of 
Article XIII GATT.29 Moreover, the General Exceptions contained in Article XX GATT 
are applicable to export restraints.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
24 Karapinar 2011, p. 1142. 
25 Kim 2010, p. 10. 
26 Karapinar 2011, p. 1152.!
27 Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 1994. 
28 Lamy 2011. 
29 World Trade Report 2010, p. 170. 
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 4.1.1. XI GATT 
Article XI GATT is the main provision regulating quantitative export restrictions. 
It states, in relevant part: 
 
“XI. General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
 
1.     No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any 
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party. 
 
2.      The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following: 
 
(a)  Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party 
 
(b)  Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or 
regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade;” 
 
4.1.1.1. Paragraph 1 
 
Article XI GATT is divided in two paragraphs. The first part proposes a 
general prohibition on quantitative restrictions. The wording of the 
article’s title indicates that it covers restrictions having a limiting effect 
on the quantity of a traded product. 
  
The purpose of this ban is to encourage the substitution of all the 
quantitative restrictions by tariffs. Price based barriers are considered to 
have a less harmful effect on trade and a more transparent application. 30  
 
In order to understand which measures can be considered as 
quantitative restrictions it is necessary to understand the concepts of 
“prohibition or restriction”. Article XI:1 GATT contains a negative 
definition of “prohibition or restriction”, banning any constraint other 
than “duties, taxes or other charges”. Undoubtedly, the wording leaves 
wide margin for interpretation. 
 
By studying the WTO case law, it is possible to deduce that the main 
criterion for evaluating the restrictiveness of a measure is the actual 
restrictive impact, obtained by examining the evidence of verifiable 
consequences for trade.31 In the case India – Quantitative Restrictions, 
the Panel identified the concept of “restriction” with the notion of 
“limiting condition”32. Furthermore, the case India – Autos established 
that “a "restriction" need not be a blanket prohibition or a precise 
numerical limit”33. In line with this resolution, in the Colombia – Ports of 
Entry case it was found that measures that are not per se addressed at 
the quantities traded, like those affecting the ports authorised to trade, 
can be considered quantitative restraints.34 In this case, which referred to 
restrictions to imports, the Panel recognised the “applicability of Article 
XI:1 to measures which create uncertainties and affect investment plans, 
restrict market access for imports or make importation prohibitively 
costly, all of which have implications on the competitive situation of an 
                                                
30 Report of the Panel. Turkey — Textiles, 117: “In contrast to MFN tariffs which permit the most efficient 
competitor to supply imports, quantitative restrictions usually have a trade-distorting effect, their allocation 
can be problematic and their administration may not be transparent.” 
31 Karapinar 2012, p. 5. 
32 Report of the Panel. India – Quantitative Restrictions, p. 166. 
33 Report of the Panel. India – Autos, p. 159. 
34 Report of the Panel. Colombia – Ports of Entry, p. 131.!
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importer”35. Following this interpretation, Article XI GATT could also be 
applied to internal measures that restrict exports.36 
 
WTO case law also considers the de facto border restrictions. In the case 
Japan – Semiconductors the Panel recognised that non-legally binding 
measures, like monitoring prices, can have similar effects to quantitative 
restrictions.37 On the other hand, the case Argentina – Hides and Leather 
gave a different approach to the de facto restraints. In this case, the 
Panel considered that the participation of members of the local leather 
industry in the export control tasks did not constitute a de facto 
restriction per se.38 
4.1.1.2. Paragraph 2 
 
The second paragraph of Article XI GATT establishes an exception from 
the general ban provided in the first paragraph. While paragraph 1 
covers both export and import restrictions, the exception of paragraph 2 
refers only to exports. Article XI:2(a) GATT allows quantitative 
restrictions on exports if they are aimed at preventing or eliminating 
situations of scarcity. 
 
However, the wording of the provision is vague, adding an element of 
uncertainty. The actual meaning of the terms used has been defined in 
the case law, particularly in the China - Raw Materials case39. 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body failed to successfully define some of 
the concepts, i.e. “essential” and ”temporary applied”, and the scope of 
this exception remains somewhat unclear. 
 
Likewise, it should be taken into account that the Appellate Body in this 
case stated that “these different concepts impart meaning to each other 
and thus define the concept of Article XI:2(a)”40. 
XI:2(a): Temporarily applied 
The panel in the China – Raw Materials case interpreted the “temporal” 
element as referring to a limited duration.41 This reasoning evolved from 
applying Article XI:2(a) GATT provision in relation with Article XX(g) 
GATT. The panel argued that not considering the exception provided in 
Article XI GATT as limited in time would undermine the application of 
Article XX(g) GATT since both articles refer to similar situations, allowing 
the parties to use indistinguishably one or the other. It also noted that 
the Chapeau requirement, applied to the general exceptions provided in 
Article XX GATT, does not cover the Article XI GATT exception, granting 
less protection in front of disguised illegal restrictions. Consequently, 
the scope of Article XI:2(a) GATT is considered more reduced and the 
measures covered by this provision have to be delimited with an expiry 
date. As a result, the Panel found that the exception could not apply to 
“long-term” measures.42 Furthermore, the panel considered that a 
schedule of revisions does not satisfy this condition, interpreting that 
                                                
35 Report of the Panel. Colombia – Ports of Entry, p. 131. 
36 This thesis focuses on “border” restrictions to exports. Internal measures that restrict exports are not being 
dealt with as they are beyond the scope of this research. For further reference, please see: Ehring and 
Chianale 2011, p. 132. 
37 Report of the Panel. Japan – Semiconductors, p. 34. 
38 Report of the Panel. Argentina - Hides and Leather, p. 179. 
39 Reports of the Appellate Body. China – Raw Materials. 
40 Reports of the Appellate Body. China – Raw Materials, p. 130. 
41 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 85. 
42 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 96. 
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the term “limited time” refers to a “fixed time-limit” for the application of 
the measure.43 
 
On the other hand, the Appellate Body offered a different interpretation 
of the term “limited time”. It stated that the length of the measure is not 
a decisive element, and that the long-term actions can be considered as 
valid as the short-term ones. Hence, the Appellate Body failed to tighten 
the requirements of this exception, limiting its application to “critical” 
situations. 
 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body explained that the two provisions, i.e. 
paragraphs XI:2(a) and XX(g) GATT, are not mutually exclusive and that 
they have different functions and entail different obligations. While the 
former applies to measures addressed to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages, the later refers to measures concerning the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. Therefore, the Appellate Body considered 
that, because of their different reach, they might be applied 
simultaneously.44 
 
XI:2(a): Prevent or relieve 
 
The use of the verb “prevent” in the wording of this article indicates that 
the parties are allowed to use Article XI:2(a) GATT even before the actual 
shortage takes place. Based on the preparatory work of the treaty, the 
purpose of this provision was to “enable a member to take remedial 
action before a critical shortage has actually arisen”45. 
 
XI:2(a):Essential products 
 
The range of products that can be subjected to the exception is defined 
in broad terms. Firstly, the article makes explicit reference to foodstuffs. 
Next, it completes the definition of the subject with any “other products 
essential to the exporting contracting party”. As a consequence, 
clarifying the concept of “essential product” becomes crucial. 
 
The Panel in China – Raw Materials case associated the concept of 
essentialness with products which are “important”, “necessary” or 
“indispensable”.46 Nevertheless, the Panel did not leave this issue open 
for the members to decide which products are considered essential to 
them. It compared Article XI GATT with Article XXI GATT, concluding that 
if a self-determination system was desired, the contracting parties would 
have used a wording similar to the one employed in Article XXI GATT. 
However, the Panel missed the occasion to provide some clear 
benchmarks which could define the concept of essentialness. 
 
Finally, the Panel asserted that the concept of essential product should 
take into account “the particular circumstances faced by that Member at 
the time when a Member applies a restriction or prohibition under 
Article XI:2(a)”47. Thus, the Panel chose a case-by-case approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
43 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 84. 
44 Reports of the Appellate Body. China – Raw Materials, p. 134. 
45 World Trade Report 2010, p. 169. 
46 Karapinar 2012, p. 8. 
47 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 90. 
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XI:2(a):Critical shortage 
 
The Panel linked the idea of “critical shortage” to the concepts of 
“decisive importance”, “crisis” or “catastrophe”.48 Once again, the Panel 
applied the exception of Article XI GATT within the context provided by 
Article XX(g). Therefore, the Panel considered that a “critical shortage” 
should be understood as referring to a situation which may “be relieved 
or prevented through the application of measures on a temporary, and 
not indefinite or permanent, basis”49. In addition, the Appellate Body 
determined that “whether a shortage is “critical” may be informed by 
how “essential” a particular product is.”50 
 
This interpretation offers an important nuance, in the sense that it 
impedes the application of Article XI:2(a) GATT to permanently limit the 
exploitation of an exhaustible natural resource. The Panel agreed with 
the EU position, which argued that when the shortage is permanent, it 
cannot be relieved or prevented by a temporary action.51 Therefore, 
members cannot establish restrictive measures with the intention of 
maintaining them until the end of the natural resource’s lifespan.  
 
XI:2(b) 
Article XI:2(b) GATT provides a second exception to the first paragraph. 
It refers to the restrictions which are necessary to apply regulations for 
the classification, grading or marketing of commodities. 
This provision was interpreted in 1988, before the creation of the WTO. 
The GATT Panel analysed it in the Canada – Herring and Salmon case, 
pointing out that, according to the wording of the GATT, the exception 
refers to regulations dealing with “the marketing of commodities in the 
international markets”. Consequently, it could be applied to “restrictions 
designed to further the marketing of a commodity by spreading supplies 
of the restricted product over a longer period of time”52. Furthermore, it 
found that measures intended to favour the production of local 
downstream industry are not covered by this exception. 
 
4.1.2. Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
After the widespread use of export restrictions and the volatility in agricultural 
prices of the 1970s, the parties to the Uruguay Round attempted a modest 
reform of the regulation of export restrictions. 
 
In Article 12, the AoA extends the scope of Article XI GATT. It establishes norms 
for the notification of restrictive measures applied under the Article XI:2(a) 
GATT exception. In addition, it proposes a system of consultations between 
importer and exporter countries. 
“Article 12: Disciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions 
1. Where any Member institutes any new export prohibition or restriction on 
foodstuffs in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of GATT 1994, the 
Member shall observe the following provisions: 
                                                
48 Karapinar 2012, p. 10. 
49 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 96. 
50 Reports of the Appellate Body. China – Raw Materials, p. 130. 
51 Karapinar 2012, p. 10 
52 Report of the Panel. Canada – Herring and Salmon, p. 11.  
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(a)  the Member instituting the export prohibition or restriction shall give due 
consideration to the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing 
Members’ food security; 
(b) before any Member institutes an export prohibition or restriction, it shall 
give notice in writing, as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on 
Agriculture comprising such information as the nature and the duration of 
such measure, and shall consult, upon request, with any other Member having 
a substantial interest as an importer with respect to any matter related to the 
measure in question.  The Member instituting such export prohibition or 
restriction shall provide, upon request, such a Member with necessary 
information. 
2. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any developing country Member, 
unless the measure is taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food 
exporter of the specific foodstuff concerned.” 
Firstly, Article 12.1 (a) AoA introduces the concept of “food security” of the 
importers, a long debated concept in the WTO.53 In this sense, it compels the 
exporting members to consider the foodstuff needs of the importing members. 
Secondly, Article 12.1(b) AoA establishes the obligation of giving writing notice 
to the Committee on Agriculture of any new prohibition or restriction on the 
export of foodstuffs. In this vein, a list of the restrictions applied from 1995 can 
be found in the WTO website.54 Furthermore, this paragraph requires the 
exporting part to conduct consultations and to provide the necessary 
information to the concerned importing parties. Nevertheless, the obligations of 
written notice and consultations are widely ignored by some member states, as 
discussed in Section 4.1.5, harming the established transparency mechanisms.55  
 
Finally, paragraph 12.2 AoA provides with an exception to the first part. 
According to this paragraph, developing countries are not bounded by 
paragraph 12.1 unless they are net-exporters of the foodstuff affected by the 
restriction. The concept of net-exporter is not defined in the treaty, so it can be 
understood in very broad terms.56 
 
The result of these provisions is a system with relaxed obligations. Even though 
Article 12 AoA requires the members of the WTO, excluding developing 
countries that are net importers of foodstuff, to notify the institution any export 
restriction on food exports and conduct consultations, there are no penalties 
for disregarding these obligations.57 
 
The consequence of this normative framework is a continuation of the situation 
existing before the signature of the Agreement on Agriculture. The food crisis 
of 2007-2010 proved that the obligations set out in Article 12 are not more 
effective in limiting export restrictions than the prior set of rules.58 A recent FAO 
paper studying the role of trade restrictive measures in this crisis concluded 
that “the current state of information provision and consultation is very poor. 
This is one area for improvement”59. 
 
 
                                                
53 The concept of “food security” goes beyond the scope of this thesis. For further reference, please see: 
Howse and Rosling 2012 and Sharma 2011. 
54 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/transparency_toolkit_e.htm 
55 Blas 2010. 
56 Sharma 2011, p. 21. 
57 Mitra and Josling 2009, p. 15. 
58 Mitra and Josling 2009, p. 15. 
59 Sharma 2011, p. 20. 
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4.1.3. XX GATT 
Article XX GATT establishes a number of General Exceptions that may apply to 
measures imposing export restrictions. Its application consists in a two tiered 
procedure. First, the restrictive measure must come under one or another of the 
sub-paragraphs listed under the letters (a) to (j). Secondly, the measure must 
also satisfy the requirement defined in the preamble of Article XX GATT, the 
Chapeau Clause. 
“Article XX: General exceptions 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(…) 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(…) 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption;  
(…) 
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure 
essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during 
periods when the domestic price of such materials is held below the world price 
as part of a governmental stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions shall 
not operate to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such 
domestic industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement 
relating to non-discrimination;  
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle 
that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international 
supply of such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent 
with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the 
conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES 
shall review the need for this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.” 
The scope of these exceptions is quite broad, including the protection of public 
morals; human and animal health; the trade of gold and silver; intellectual and 
industrial property; prison labour; national treasures; exhaustive natural 
resources; intergovernmental commodity agreements; local access to products 
that are an essential input for the national industry or that are in short supply. 
 
Some of the exceptions from Article XX GATT apply more frequently to the use 
of export restrictions. This section analyses the ones that are more relevant for 
the understanding of the WTO’s export restrictions regime. 
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4.1.3.1. XX(b) 
 
Sub-paragraph XX(b) allows restrictive measures as a means to protect 
“human, animal or plant life or health” and it has been regularly applied 
to justify export restrictions. 
  
The scope of this exception in relation to the regulation of export 
restrictions was defined by the Panel in the case China – Raw Materials. 
In order to determine the applicability of sub-paragraph XX(b) to a 
restrictive measure, the Panel examined five different criteria, i.e. if the 
measure was necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
the importance of the interests or values at issue; the contribution of the 
measure to the objective pursued; the trade restrictiveness of the 
measure; and the availability of WTO-consistent or less trade restrictive 
alternative measures. In addition, the Panel added that the evaluation of 
the appropriateness of a measure should be conducted as a holistic 
process.60 
 
Firstly, according to the wording of sub-paragraph XX(b), for a measure 
to be justified under this exception it has to be “necessary” to protect 
life or health. In the Korea – Various Measures on Beef case, the 
Appellate Body examined the concept of “necessary” in relation to the 
application of sub-paragraph XX(d), suggesting that the term “necessary” 
refers to the concept of “indispensable”. Therefore, for a measure to be 
considered “necessary”, it has to be absolutely or nearly “indispensable” 
to achieve the pursued policy objectives of protection of life or health. 
The method proposed to evaluate the indispensability of an action is to 
conduct a balance of the different elements of the measure together 
with the consequences of its application. The Appellate Body established 
that an assessment of indispensability involves a “process of weighing 
and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the 
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the 
law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or 
values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact 
of the law or regulation on imports or exports”61.  
 
Secondly, the Panel considered the importance of the values that are 
meant to be protected, applying the findings of previous cases. The 
Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef determined that the 
“more vital or important those common interests or values are, the 
easier it would be to accept as "necessary" a measure designed as an 
enforcement instrument”62. In a more recent case, the Brazil – Retreated 
Tyres Appellate Body reaffirmed the importance of considering the 
“interests or values underlying the objective”63.  
 
The third criterion examined by the Panel is the existence of a “genuine 
relationship” between the restrictive measures applied and the objective 
pursued. In order to evaluate the extent of the measure’s contribution to 
the accomplishment of the final objective, the Appellate Body in the 
Brazil – Retreated Tyres interpreted that the measure has to be “apt to 
make a material contribution to the achievement of its objective”64. 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body in the case China – Audiovisual 
Products indicated that “[t]he greater the contribution a measure makes 
                                                
60 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 137. 
61 Report of the Appellate Body. Korea – Various Measures on Beef, p. 50. 
62 Report of the Appellate Body. Korea – Various Measures on Beef, p. 49.  
63 Report of the Appellate Body. Brazil – Retreated Tyres, p. 83. 
64 Report of the Appellate Body. Brazil – Retreated Tyres, p. 59.!
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to the objective pursued, the more likely it is to be characterised as 
"necessary"”65. 
 
Fourthly, the Panel examined the actual restrictive effects on 
international trade of the considered measure. The relationship between 
the “necessity” and the “restrictiveness” of a measure was defined by the 
Appellate Body in the China – Audiovisual Products case. It explained 
that the “less restrictive the effects of the measure, the more likely it is 
to be characterised as "necessary””66. Furthermore, it suggested that the 
respondent party must try to minimise the restrictive effects of the 
employed measures. It observed that “if a Member chooses to adopt a 
very restrictive measure, it will have to ensure that the measure is 
carefully designed so that the other elements to be taken into account in 
weighing and balancing the factors relevant to an assessment of the 
"necessity" of the measure will "outweigh" such restrictive effect”67. 
 
Finally, the Panel stated that it is necessary to consider the existence of 
a less harmful alternative having similar effects. The responding party 
has to demonstrate that the alternative measures proposed by the 
complainants are not “reasonably available” or do not provide a similar 
contribution to the fulfillment of its objective. It is part of the “weighing 
and balancing” process to determine if an alternative measure, which is 
consistent with the WTO obligations or less trade restrictive, could 
“reasonably be expected to employ”68. For a measure to be “reasonably 
available”, it must not suppose a disproportionate burden for the 
responding party, e.g., imposing prohibitive costs or relevant technical 
difficulties. In the China – Raw Materials case, the Panel stated that a 
“reasonably available” alternative measure must be “both practically and 
financially feasible for the Member seeking to justify a WTO-inconsistent 
measure under Article XX(b)” and must provide “an equivalent 
contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued”69. 
 
Therefore, the members of the WTO imposing a restrictive measure have 
to “weigh” and “balance” the effects and the expediency of the 
alternative measures by using this necessity test. 
4.1.3.2. XX(g) 
 
Article XX(g) allows restrictions related to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources when applied together with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption. This exception has been 
consistently used to justify export restrictions. In contrast with the 
exception contained in Article XI:2(a) GATT, XX(g) GATT allows long-term 
exclusions to the general ban of quantitative export restraints. 
 
The application of Article XX(g) GATT to measures prohibiting or 
restraining export has been defined in the WTO case law, notably by the 
Panel in the China – Raw Materials case. 
 
In this case, the Panel considered that, in order to be covered by Article 
XX(g) GATT exception, a measure has to fulfill two conditions. Firstly, it 
has to be related to the conservation of an exhaustible resource. 
                                                
65 Report of the Appellate Body. China Audiovisual Products, p. 111. 
66 Report of the Appellate Body. China Audiovisual Products, p. 132. 
67 Report of the Appellate Body. China Audiovisual Products, p. 132. 
68 Report of the Appellate Body. Korea – Various Measures on Beef, p. 50. 
69 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 138. 
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Secondly, it has to be made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption.  
 
“Relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” 
 
The GATT Panel in the 1987 Canada – Herring and Salmon case, before 
the establishment of the WTO, defined the notion “related to the 
conservation”. The Panel noted that the concept “relating to” used to 
define the purpose of the measure was particularly wide as opposed to 
“necessary” or “essential”, employed in other sub-paragraphs of Article 
XX of the GATT. However, the Panel studied it in conjunction with the 
Preamble of Article XX, the Chapeau Clause, and the second condition of 
“restrictions on domestic production or consumption”, and concluded 
that “relating to” refers to measures “primarily aimed at” the 
conservation of natural resources. After the constitution of the WTO, the 
Appellate Body in the US – Gasoline case followed this interpretation.70 In 
US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body confirmed the “primarily aimed at” 
definition and added that the relationship between the restrictive 
measure and the conservation of natural resources should be “a close 
and genuine relationship of ends and means”71. 
 
The concept of “conservation” was discussed in the Panel Report of the 
China – Raw Materials case. In China’s view, the wording of sub-
paragraph XX(g) conferred on the term “conservation” the meaning that 
the Member’s sovereign rights over its natural resources included 
“preserving” its natural resources. Furthermore, China considered that 
these sovereign rights could be exercised in the interest of the 
Member’s social and economic development. The Panel interpreted sub-
paragraph XX(g) in the light of the fundamental principles of 
international law, concluding that abiding by the WTO obligations could 
not be considered a breach of China’s sovereign rights72. Moreover, the 
Panel noted that sub-paragraph XX(i), which refers to the use of export 
restrictions to support a domestic industry, also includes the interests of 
the foreign producers as a conditioning factor. Hence, the Panel 
concluded that sub-paragraph XX(g) could not be interpreted in a way 
that could circumvent the provisions of sub-paragraph XX(i).73 
 
As for the concept “exhaustible natural resources”, the different Panels 
have proposed a broad interpretation of the provision. The Panel in the 
US – Gasoline case confirmed the abstract concept of “clean air” as a 
valid natural resource that could fall under the scope of sub-paragraph 
XX(g). In the US – Shrimps case, the Appellate Body updated the concept 
of “exhaustible resources”, adding living creatures to the list of 
protected commodities. Even if living resources can be considered as 
“renewables”, the fact that they can become extinguished motivated the 
dynamic approach of the Panel. These interpretations were in line with 
the objective of “sustainable development” stated in the WTO Agreement 
Preamble.74 
 
“If such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption” 
 
                                                
70 Report of the Appellate Body. US – Gasoline, p. 18. 
71 Report of the Appellate Body. US – Shrimps, p. 52. 
72 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 114. 
73 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 114.!
74 Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO: “use of the world’s resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so”. 
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Secondly, the restrictive measure has to be made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic producers or consumers. The Appellate 
Body in the US – Gasoline case established the condition of “even-
handedness” application. This concept implies that the country has to 
extend the restrictions to domestic products, even though the Panel 
found no grounds to demand entirely equal restraints.75 In the China – 
Raw Materials case, the Panel interpreted that a restriction on domestic 
consumption “must not only be applied jointly with the challenged 
export restrictions but, in addition, the purpose of those export 
restrictions must be to ensure the effectiveness of those domestic 
restrictions”76. However, the Appellate Body, in a following stage, 
reversed this interpretation. It considered that, in order to fall under the 
scope of sub-paragraph XX(g), a measure do not need to be “primarily 
aimed at” rendering effective a restriction in national consumption or 
production of an exhaustive national resource. The Appellate Body 
suggested that the application of the restrictive measures on exports in 
combination with restrictions on local consumption is enough to fulfill 
the second condition. 
4.1.3.3. XX(i) 
 
Sub-paragraph XX(i) provides an exception for the establishment of 
export restrictions in order “to ensure essential quantities of such 
materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the 
domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of 
a governmental stabilisation plan”. 
This exception was proposed to give more flexibility to countries 
implementing programmes of general prize stabilisation.77 However, sub-
paragraph XX(i) adds two conditions to its application. In the first place, 
the exception cannot constitute a disguised support to exportation or 
protection to the local industry. In the second place, the subparagraph 
indicates that it “shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement 
relating to nondiscrimination”. 
It is not clear in which conditions the XX(i) exception could be applied 
nowadays since it remains widely unused. Furthermore, a recent study 
suggests that a considerable proportion of the preferential agreements 
signed nowadays limits the application of this exception.78 
4.1.3.4. XX(j) 
 
Sub-paragraph XX(j) allows the use of restrictive measures when they are 
“essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or 
local short supply”. This provision was intended to grant the possibility 
of applying quantitative restrictions in the post-war context. Its objective 
was to supplement the different policies dealing with shortages in the 
aftermath of the war.79 Consequently, the exception was created with an 
expiration date. However, this expiration date has been repeatedly 
                                                
75 Report of the Appellate Body. US – Gasoline, p. 21. 
76 Reports of the Panel. China – Raw Materials, p. 116. 
77 Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical Index 1995, p. 591. 
78 Korinek and Bartos 2012, p. 30. 
79 Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical Index 1995, p. 594.!
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postponed until 1970, when it was “retained with no provision for 
further review”80. 
It is hard to foresee how sub-paragraph XX(j) would apply nowadays. The 
exception refers to “general or local short supply” of a particular 
product. This formulation intended to give flexibility to members in its 
application, allowing restrictions even when the situation of short supply 
does not affect other markets around the world.81 The subparagraph 
establishes two conditions to its application. Firstly, it requires that the 
enacted measures “shall be consistent with the principle that all 
contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international 
supply of such products”. Secondly, it provides that these measures 
“shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have 
ceased to exist”. The provision has only been interpreted in 1949 in a 
conflict between the United States and Czechoslovakia that did not result 
in an extensive legal analysis. Furthermore, essential elements of the 
XX(j) exception, such as the concept of “short supply”, remain unclear82 
and its application is limited by a considerable number of preferential 
agreements.83 
Nevertheless, as described above, sub-paragraph XX(j) has served to 
define the scope of the exception contained in Article XI:2(a). The 
Appellate Body in the China – Raw Materials case compared the term 
“critical shortage” of Article XI:2(a) GATT with the words “general or local 
short supply”. The Appellate Body concluded that, in the absence of the 
adjective “critical” in the latter, the “the kinds of shortages that fall 
within Article XI:2(a) are more narrowly circumscribed than those falling 
within the scope of Article XX(j)”84. 
4.1.3.5. XX Chapeau Clause 
!
The Preamble of Article XX was inserted as fears rose during the drafting 
process that the general exceptions would be used as an umbrella for 
protectionist behaviour. The delegates noted that “[i]ndirect protection is 
an undesirable and dangerous phenomenon”85. 
 
The preamble constitutes the “Chapeau Clause”, that provides for a 
second-step examination of a restrictive measure. If a country wants to 
apply one of the general exceptions, it must first prove that it falls under 
one of the subparagraphs of Article XX. Where that is the case, the 
subject has also to determine that the measure fulfills the requirement 
of the “Chapeau”.86 
 
The “Chapeau” focuses on the discriminatory character, the possible 
application of reasonable alternatives and the disguised protectionist 
purposes. Therefore, according to its Preamble any action will be 
excluded from Article XX when it is “applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade”. 
                                                
80 Report on Work since the Twenty-sixth session of the Council of Representatives 1970, p. 22. 
81 World Trade Report 2010, p. 168. 
82 Korinek and Bartos 2012, p. 13. 
83 Korinek and Bartos 2012, p. 30. 
84 Reports of the Appellate Body. China – Raw Materials, p. 130. 
85 Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical Index 1995, p. 563. 
86 Report of the Appellate Body. US – Gasoline, p. 22.!
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In spite of the crucial character of the Chapeau Clause as an unavoidable 
second step in the application of Article XX, it has not played a relevant 
role in the settlement of disputes concerning the use of export 
restrictive measures. 
 
4.1.4. XXI GATT 
Article XXI GATT constitutes a general exception for reasons of security. 
Paragraph XXI(b) GATT states that nothing in the WTO agreements should be 
disposed in a manner such that forbids a country to take any action that 
considers necessary for the protection of its security. The formulation of the 
article leaves a wide margin of discretion to the parties in the application of this 
exception, establishing a system based on nearly total self-determination. 
!
4.1.5. Notifications Obligations 
The notification procedure for export restrictions is based on the Ministerial 
Decision on Notification Procedures adopted in 1993. The decision requires the 
members of the WTO to notify “to the maximum extent possible, their adoption 
of trade measures affecting the operation of GATT 1994”87. In addition, the 
Ministerial Declaration states that the introduction or modification of such 
measures is subjected to the commitments of the Understanding Regarding 
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance of 197988.  
The Decision provides in its Annex with an “indicative” list of the “notifiable” 
measures, which explicitly mentions “quantitative restrictions”, “export taxes” 
and “Export restrictions, including voluntary export restraints and orderly 
marketing arrangements”. 
However, these agreements do not establish any sort of sanctions or 
enforcement procedure. Article III of the Decision entrusts the review of the 
notification obligations of the members to the Council for Trade in Goods. 
Nevertheless, the provision is drafted in vague terms and does not entail any 
serious commitment. Likewise, Article II of the Declaration, which refers to the 
establishment of a Central Registry of Notifications, asserts that the Registry 
“shall draw the attention of individual Members to regular notification 
requirements which remain unfulfilled”89. However, this control mechanism does 
not result in further obligations for the members of the agreement. 
After the Uruguay Round, the Council for Trade in Goods established a set of 
biennial notification procedures.90 However, the format of the notification 
focuses on the quantitative restrictions and does not include export taxes. The 
Council also established a “reverse” notification procedure91, by which the 
member could indicate specific non-tariff measures applied by other members, 
whenever they are not subject to other notification system. Nevertheless, this 
system has rarely been used.92 
In its 2008 Revised Submission on Export Taxes, the European Union stated that 
the current notifications system “has had little, if any, practical effect on 
Members’ level of transparency”93. In addition, the communication proposes the 
establishment of a new legal framework that ensures the enforcement of the 
                                                
87 Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures 1993, p. 389. 
88 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 1979. 
89 Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures 1993, p. 389. 
90 Decision G/L/59 of the CTG of 10 January 1996 on notification procedures for quantitative restrictions. 
91 Decision G/L/60 of the CTG of 10 January 1996 on reverse notification of non-tariff measures. 
92 Kim 2010, p. 16. 
93 Communication from the European Communities on a Revised Submission on Export Taxes 2008, p. 3. 
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existing obligations. In this regard, it suggests using as a model the Uruguay 
Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994, which 
refers to the notification requirements of the members’ state trading 
enterprises.94 
Finally, the WTO regime has two complementary information procedures. On 
the one hand, Article X of the GATT proposes the publication of any information 
concerning the restriction or prohibition of exports. On the other hand, the 
Trade Policy Reports of the WTO Secretariat provide in-depth analysis of the 
restrictive measures applied by the members. However, these reviews are not 
regularly published and are thus frequently outdated.95 
!
4.1.6. The Regulation of Export Duties 
The WTO framework evidences an important loophole in its regulation of export 
restrictions. While Article XI GATT provides a general prohibition of quantitative 
export restrictions, disciplines for export duties are practically non-existent. 
The reason for this loophole is arguably a lack of foresight during the 
negotiations. The GATT agreements of 1947, based on a mercantilist approach, 
focused largely on the control of import restrictions.96 The incorporation of 
Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture in 1994 did not effectively address 
the problem. 
4.1.6.1. Article II GATT 
!
Article II gives legal effect to the tariff concessions agreed upon in the 
schedules. While most of the paragraphs of this article refer exclusively 
to imports, paragraph II:1(a) makes use of the ambiguous term 
“commerce”. 
“Article II: Schedules of Concessions 
1.   (a)     Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the 
other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided 
for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this 
Agreement (…)” 
The debate over the binding effect of this provision when referring to 
exports is an old one.97 Nevertheless, a recent article by Ehring and 
Chianale offered compelling arguments for the existence of a binding 
element for exports.98 Firstly, the authors pointed out that the term 
“commerce” encompasses both imports and exports. Second, they 
indicated that in the case Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, which 
referred to import duties, the Appellate Body found that “Paragraph (a) 
of Article II:1 contains a general prohibition against according treatment 
less favourable to imports than that provided for in a Member's 
Schedule”99. Third, they established that, even though the agreed 
schedules refer primarily to import duties, the 1947 schedules from the 
                                                
94 Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994. 
95 Kim 2010, p. 23. 
96 Barfield 2008. 
97 Roessler 1975, p. 34; Rom 1984, p. 128; Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 2003, p. 220. 
98 Ehring and Chianale 2011, p. 112. 
99 Report of the Appellate Body. Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, p. 17. 
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Malayan Union and Australia contained export duty commitments that 
were arguably based on the binding effect of Article II:1(a). Finally, the 
article claims that the paragraph provides a sufficiently precise, 
unconditional and independent obligation, and is thus of a self-standing 
normative nature. Nevertheless, as the authors pointed out, the issue 
will not be completely clear until the DSU of the WTO rules on it. This 
clarification would not be very relevant in the short term since the 
commitments agreed upon in the schedules referring to exports are 
exceptional. However, this legal nuance may be of great importance in 
the future, as it would provide legal effect to hypothetical export duty 
commitments inscribed in schedules.100 In any case, the lack of 
commitments in the agreed schedules leaves export duties widely 
unregulated. 
 
4.1.6.2. Alternative Disciplines 
 
Export tariffs remain a conflictive issue and can generate considerable 
harm to international trade. Consequently, some governments and 
practitioners have proposed imaginative techniques to limit the 
application of these measures. 
The use of the ASCM to address the use of export duties is an illustrative 
example. In the US –Export Restraints case, Canada brought actions 
before the WTO regarding the US Statement of Administrative Action101, 
which amended the Tariff Act of 1930 by interpreting the Uruguay 
Round Agreements. According to its own terms, the Statement of 
Administrative Action “represents an authoritative expression by the 
Administration regarding the interpretation and application of the 
Uruguay Round agreements, both for purposes of US international 
obligations and domestic law.”102 The Statement of Administrative Action 
advocated for an extensive application of the countervailing measures 
defined by Article VI of the GATT. It provided a broad interpretation of 
the concepts “entrusts or directs” as referred to the procedure by which 
a government can grant a subsidy, including any measure that could 
create a discernable benefit for the local industry. It furthermore 
asserted that the “Administration plans to continue its policy of not 
permitting the indirect provision of a subsidy to become a loophole 
when unfairly traded imports enter the United States and injure a U.S. 
industry”103. 
As for the export duties, the Statement of Administrative Action named 
some examples, e.g. soft lumber products from Canada or leather from 
Argentina, which involved export restrictions “that led directly to a 
discernible lowering of input costs” for the local producers104. As a result, 
the US Department of Commerce considered export restraints equivalent 
to financial contributions. On the other hand, Canada considered this 
approach inconsistent with the US obligations under Articles 1.1 and 
35.1 of the ASCM. 
The Panel resolved that export restraints do not constitute a 
“government-entrusted” or “government-directed” support that qualifies 
                                                
100 Ehring and Chianale 2011, p. 117. 
101 Statement of Administrative Action 1994. 
102 Report of the Panel. US –Export Restraints, p. 2. 
103 Report of the Panel. US –Export Restraint, p. 3. 
104 Report of the Panel. US –Export Restraint, p. 3.!
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as a “financial contribution”, which is one of the two mandatory 
requirements for a measure to be classified as a subsidy. Hence, the 
Panel determined that countervailing measures adopted by the US in 
order to address Canada’s exports restraints were inconsistent with 
Article 1.1 of the ASCM105. 
Nevertheless, some practitioners suggest that the application of the 
ASCM to export restrictions remains an option, particularly in the case of 
the selective reduction or elimination of tax rebates106. The problem 
arises from the fact that some members of the WTO apply VAT rebates 
as an instrument of industrial policy. By means of having higher tax 
rates for primary products than for manufactured products, countries 
promote their downstream industries. During the 2008 EU Conference in 
Raw Materials, Mathew Nicely argued that countervailing measures can 
be successfully applied on differential VAT rebates based on two recent 
developments107. Firstly, in the 2006 Trade Policy Review of China, the 
WTO Secretariat pointed out that the Chinese “export taxes may 
implicitly subsidise domestic downstream processing”108. Secondly, in 
2005, the Appellate Body Report in the US – DRAMS case applied Article 
1.1(a)(1) ASCM to a scheme of “indirect” support.109 On the other hand, 
Claude Barfield pointed out that the application of the US – DRAMS 
rationale to the VAT rebates is a “stretch” and that defined the legal 
precedent as “murky”.110 
The European Commission joined the debate in 2012 by initiating an 
anti-subsidy investigation on imports of biodiesel originating in 
Argentina and Indonesia in parallel to an anti-dumping investigation on 
the same products111. Since it was alleged in the complaint that these 
export tax schemes are subsidies on which countervailing measures can 
be imposed112, the investigation should determine whether they 
represent subsidies in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
“Article 1 Definition of a Subsidy 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to 
exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body 
within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as 
"government"), i.e. where: 
                                                
105 Report of the Panel. US –Export Restraint, p. 94. 
106 Nicely 2008. 
107 Nicely 2008. 
108 Trade Policy Review of China 2006, p. 99. 
109 Report of the Appellate Body. US – DRAMS, p. 43. 
110 Barfield 2008. 
111 Notice of initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding concerning imports of biodiesel originating in  
Argentina and Indonesia 2012. 
112 Notice of initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding concerning imports of biodiesel originating in  
Argentina and Indonesia 2012:  “It is alleged that the above schemes are subsidies since they involve a 
financial contribution from the Government of Argentina and Indonesia (in the form of the entrustment 
and/or direction of the input producers to provide goods to the domestic biodiesel industry, or through 
income or price support) and confer a benefit to the recipients because the goods are provided for less than 
adequate remuneration. They are alleged to be limited to certain enterprises producing a subset of products 
in the agricultural sector, and are therefore specific and countervailable.” 
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(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, 
loans,  and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or 
liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected 
(e.g.  fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts 
or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments; 
or 
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article 
XVI of GATT 1994; 
and 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.” 
It is clear that the mentioned policies confer a benefit to the biodiesel 
industry in Argentina and Indonesia. Therefore, the central question is 
whether differential export duties can be considered a financial 
contribution from the government as defined in paragraph 1.1(a)(1)(iv) 
ASCM, which applies to the cases where a government provides indirect 
support. 
The interpretation of the term “private body” given by the case law is 
quite far-reaching, so the input producers could easily fit that 
definition.113 Moreover, the phrase “which would normally be vested in 
the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments” has also been defined broadly, and 
the export duties schemes could arguably fit that criterion.114 
Nevertheless, the actions of the Argentinian and Indonesian 
governments could unlikely be considered an “entrustment” to a private 
party as interpreted in the case law.  As mentioned above, the US – 
DRAMS case defined the scope of paragraph 1.1(a)(1)(iv) ASCM. This case 
extended the concept of “entrust” to situations where “a government 
gives responsibility to a private body”115 from the more restrictive 
approach of the US –Export Restraints case, which limited it to acts of 
delegation. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body in the same case stated 
that the concepts of “entrustment and direction do not cover ‘the 
situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, 
which may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given 
factual circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in 
that market’”116, confirming the interpretation given by the US – Export 
Restrains Panel. Following this line of reasoning, it is highly unlikely that 
                                                
113 Report of the Panel. US - Export Restraints, p. 86. 
114 Report of the Panel. US - Export Restraints, p. 89. 
115 Report of the Appellate Body. US – DRAMS, p. 43. 
116 Report of the Appellate Body. US – DRAMS, p. 41.
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the Appellate Body will support the use of anti-subsidy countervailing 
measures to tackle the harmful effects of export duties. Ultimately, it is 
clear that the Members harmed by export restrictions in the form of 
export duties have little chance to address them by means of the ASCM.  
Moreover, it is important to remember that export duties are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of Articles XI and VIII GATT. Thus, arguably, the 
Contracting Parties intended to establish a loose regime for export 
duties and addressing them by means of the ASCM would defeat the 
purpose of the GATT. Furthermore, as Claude Barfield pointed out, the 
imposition of export duties is a common practice for many Members of 
the WTO, particularly developing countries, and therefore a restriction of 
their use would be highly controversial and would widen the division 
between developed and developing countries at a multilateral level.117 
Finally, a broader interpretation of paragraph 1.1(a)(1)(iv) ASCM would 
reach any government measure that increased the domestic supply of a 
good, overreaching the object and purpose of the ASCM.118 
Howse and Josling proposed a different approach to address export 
duties.119 They argued in a recent article that the concept of “export 
restrictions” could be extended to include a number of export taxes, 
which would be thus covered by the general prohibition of Article XI 
GATT. The discussion is not a new one. Matsushita, Schoenbaum and 
Mavroidis proposed already in 2003 that Article XI can be applied when 
an export duty has the effect of an export ban.120 
In order to determine which export tax could be included, Howse and 
Josling suggested a “purposive interpretation” of the concept of “export 
restrictions”. According to them, Article XI GATT needs to be put into the 
context of Article VIII GATT121, which “suggests that what was understood 
by an export tax was a measure imposed for fiscal (e.g. revenue-raising) 
purposes not trade restricting ones”122. Therefore, they considered that 
an export duty designed with protectionist purposes should fall under 
the scope of Article XI GATT. In addition, they argued that this 
interpretation is consistent with the general jurisprudence on Article XI 
GATT. To this end, they cited two cases, i.e. India – Autos and US – 
Tobacco, that suggest that “not only the form but also the purpose and 
                                                
117 Barfield 2008. 
118 Report of the Panel. US - Export Restraints, p. 89. 
119 Howse and Rosling 2012, p. 17. 
120 Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 2003, p. 220.  
121 Article VIII of the GATT: “Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation  
1.       (a)      All fees and charges of whatever character (other than import and export duties and 
other than taxes within the purview of Article III) imposed by contracting parties on or in connection 
with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount to the approximate cost of services 
rendered and shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic products or a taxation of imports 
or exports for fiscal purposes. 
 
[…] 
 
4.       The provisions of this Article shall extend to fees, charges, formalities and requirements 
imposed by governmental authorities in connection with importation and exportation, including those 
relating to: 
 
(a)      consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certificates; 
(b)      quantitative restrictions; 
(c)      licensing; 
(d)      exchange control; 
(e)      statistical services; 
(f)      documents, documentation and certification; 
(g)      analysis and inspection; and 
(h)      quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.” 
122 Howse and Rosling 2012, p. 17. 
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effect of a measure should be taken into account in determining whether 
it is covered by Article XI disciplines”123. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of Article XI GATT proposed by Howles 
and Josling has some important flaws. In addition to the above-
mentioned arguments, e.g. the explicit exclusion of export duties from 
Article XI GAT, it is clear that their interpretation of Article VIII is highly 
deductive. The authors assumed that the article suggests a “fiscal 
purpose” for export duties simply because it uses the phrase “a taxation 
of imports or exports for fiscal purposes”. Furthermore, Article VIII GATT 
also mentions the purpose of “indirect protection to domestic products” 
together with the “fiscal purpose” of a measure, which is a particular 
aspect that is disregarded by the authors. Following the authors’ 
argumentation, it is thus possible to conclude that Article VIII GATT 
suggests a second interpretation for the notion of “export tax”, namely 
the measures which provide “indirect protection to domestic products”. 
Finally, even if the Appellate Body would adopt one of these 
interpretations, a new regulation of export duties will be necessary in 
the long-term. The alternative approaches focus on the use of export 
duties in a protectionist manner. However, export taxes imposed with 
fiscal purposes are likewise damaging and generate similar levels of 
welfare loss. Therefore, the parties should aim at eliminating them in the 
long run. 
4.2. WTO Plus 
 
The membership of the WTO has experienced a notable evolution after the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation. Since 1994, 30 new 
countries have signed Protocols of Accession with the organisation, increasing the 
number of members to 158. 
The range of the norms related to export restrictions contained in these Accession 
Protocols presents remarkable disparities. In the great majority of the cases they 
only establish a soft commitment, namely applying national norms in conformity 
with the WTO regulations. In some other cases, the Protocol provides a list of the 
restrictions used by the accessing members, including occasionally a justification 
for their application. However, in a reduced number of cases, the Accession 
Protocols lead to a stricter regime, which is commonly referred to as WTO Plus. In 
the cases of Vietnam, China, Mongolia, Ukraine, Tajikistan or Russia the Protocols 
provide an extensively detailed list of the allowed and forbidden export 
restrictions. The acceding members are thus required to make specific 
commitments in order to eliminate or reduce the more trade-distorting 
measures.124 However, the establishment of stricter commitments for the acceding 
countries is generating an asymmetric framework between the recently acceding 
members and the rest of the membership.  
The case of China is particularly illustrative of the limitation of export restrictions 
by means of an accession protocol, both because its deep economic implications 
and because it has been the subject of a WTO case. Article 7.1 of the Accession 
Protocol on non-tariff measures compels China to follow the Annex 3 schedule of 
“Non-tariff measures subject to phased elimination”. Furthermore, the 7.2 provides 
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that China “shall eliminate and shall not introduce, re-introduce or apply non-tariff 
measures that cannot be justified under the provisions of the WTO Agreement”125. 
Additionally, Article 11 of the same Protocol establishes a regime for export duties 
that is considerably stricter than the generic WTO framework. The 11.3 dictates 
that the accessing country “shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports 
unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in conformity 
with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994”126.  
It is thus evident that the construction resulting of the Chinese accession goes 
beyond the original commitments of the WTO agreements. In addition, the 
interpretation proposed in the China – Raw Materials case of the application of 
Article XX of the GATT limits even more the Chinese position. The applicability of 
Article XX GATT to justify the breach of the clauses of the Chinese Accession 
Protocol arose for the first time during the China – Publications and Audiovisual 
Products case. In this case, the Appellate Body decided to clarify the issue in order 
to avoid uncertainty around China's implementation obligations127. It analysed the 
phrase “right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement” 
contained in Article 5.1 of the Accession Protocol and concluded that this 
formulation implied China’s capacity to apply “certain rights to take regulatory 
action that derogates from obligations under the WTO Agreement—that is, to 
relevant exceptions”128. In other words, the Appellate Body asserted the Chinese 
capacity of employing the General Exceptions of Article XX GATT to the China – 
Publications and Audiovisual Products case. However, the Appellate Body did not 
expressly state whether China could apply these exceptions to the rest of the 
Accession Protocol. 
In 2012, the Panel in the China – Raw Materials case, then upheld by the Appellate 
Body, found that the General Exceptions of the GATT were not applicable to Article 
11.3 of the Accession Protocol. The Panel pointed out the different formulations of 
Articles 11.3 and 5.1. Whereas Article 5.1 makes an explicit reference to the WTO 
Agreement, Article 11.3 does not mention the totality of it, but only Article VIII of 
the GATT.129 Therefore, the Panel understood that China could not invoke Article 
XX GATT to justify a behaviour contrary to the commitments contained in Article 
11 of its Accession Protocol. 
The conclusions on the applicability of Article XX were hardly relevant for the result 
of the China – Raw Materials case. The Appellate Body clearly stated that the 
challenged Chinese policies did not fulfill the requirements of Article XX(b) or XX(g) 
GATT. It did not even consider necessary to proceed with a second-step 
examination of the Chapeau Clause. However, this restrictive interpretation has 
important consequences for the future implementation of the Chinese obligations. 
Furthermore, it is highly relevant for the position of other WTO members that have 
signed similar Accession Protocols like Russia. 
Since Russia has traditionally used export restrictions as part of its trade policy, 
the regulation of export restrictions has been one of the key issues in the 
negotiations of its accession to the WTO.130  
                                                
125 Protocol of Accession of the People's Republic of China, p. 5. 
126 Protocol of Accession of the People's Republic of China, p. 7. 
127 Report of the Appellate Body. China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, p. 96. 
128 Report of the Appellate Body. China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, p. 99. 
129 Article 11.3 Protocol of Accession of the People's Republic of China: China shall eliminate all taxes and 
charges applied to exports unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in 
conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.!
130 Intracen 2012, p. 2. 
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The final commitments agreed upon at the Russian accession included the 
establishment of schedules for the export duties on over 700 tariff lines. The 
products included in these schedules are divers, including raw materials and 
industrial products. In some cases, a transition period that goes from one to five 
years is stipulated for certain lines. The method used for the calculation of the 
duty also depends on the product observed, i.e. ad valor, specific or alternative 
method. The alternative methods are primarily used for the calculation of the 
export taxes of hydrocarbons and consist in a formula which takes into account 
the world price for crude oil.131 
The Russian export duties regime was a sensible issue for the European Union, 
particularly after the establishment of export duties on raw lumber in 2007, for 
which the Finish lumber processing industry is highly dependent.132 The Russian 
commitments on export restrictions were further developed in a bilateral 
agreement with the European Union, which is discussed in Section 4.3. 
 
4.3. The Doha Development Round 
 
When the Doha Round was opened in 2001, export restrictions were not part of 
the main points in the agenda. Some countries like Japan and Switzerland made 
some proposals on the issue, trying to increase the regulation on export tariffs and 
prohibitions.133 However, when referring to the conditions of trade in commodities, 
the major priorities of the Round were reducing the high import rates and curving 
subsidies in the developed world.134 Nevertheless, the situation has experienced a 
remarkable evolution. The proliferation in the use of export restrictions and the 
global shortage in some particular products have set these measures as an 
important part of the Doha discussions. 
 
The different proposals on export restrictions regulation have been submitted in 
the context of the Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations and the Agriculture 
Negotiations. 
 
4.4. Agricultural Negotiations 
 
The discussion of the regulation of export restriction started in 2000 under the 
mandate of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, one year before the 
official opening of the Doha Development Round.135 In this context, a number of 
WTO members submitted proposals regarding the export restriction disciplines. 
The United States comprehensive proposal centered the issue on disciplining 
export restrictions that could affect food security or privilege national industries. 
However, it did not propose specific measures to tackle these problems.136 
Likewise, the Cairns Group proposal, which represents the position of some of the 
biggest producers of agricultural products, suggested an improved discipline of 
export restrictions and taxes. Nevertheless, its proposal took a conservative 
approach and recommended to preserve the provision 12(2) AoA, which 
establishes an exception for the developing countries.137 
Some importing countries, more dependent on the international markets to 
guarantee their supply of foodstuff, took a more determined position.138 Japan, in 
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an ambitious proposal, suggested replacing all quantitative export restriction with 
export taxes. Furthermore, it proposed to create quotas in which a certain amount 
of exports would be exempt from the application of export taxes, and to bind the 
remaining taxes to scheduled rates. As for the application of emergency restrictive 
measures like the ones covered by Article XI:2(a) GATT, Japan proposed a stricter 
discipline. First, it argued for the introduction of a consultation procedure as a 
prerequisite for the establishment of emergency measures. Second, it proposed to 
require the members to maintain the proportion of exports at the level of the 
preceding years when establishing quantitative export restrictions. Finally, it 
invited the members to limit the duration of emergency measures.139  
The Korean proposal suggested prohibiting the exporting countries from imposing 
export restrictions arbitrarily or from applying export taxes with a restrictive 
purpose.140 Switzerland went further by supporting the elimination of all export 
restrictions on agricultural products and the binding at zero of all export tariffs, 
with the exception of a “flexibility clause” for the least developed countries. 
With the inclusion of the Agriculture Negotiations in the Doha Development Round 
in 2001, the topic stayed out of the debate and did not play a relevant part in the 
agenda. However, in 2008 Switzerland and Japan submitted an informal paper that 
advocated for the limitation of exporters’ ability to restrict the export of 
foodstuffs.141 The proposal left the previous demands of prohibition of export 
restrictions and argued instead for the “due consideration” of the food security of 
the importing countries. Following this system, countries would be required to 
notify restrictive measures and to open consultations with the affected countries. 
Moreover, Switzerland and Japan proposed the creation of a “standing committee 
of experts”, which would act as an arbitrator when the differences could not be 
resolved within a particular period142. However, the proposal was opposed by some 
developing countries and was therefore not included in the text-based 
negotiations143. 
Additionally, a proposal backed by the United States, Japan, Japan, Ukraine and the 
Chinese Taipei argued for new norms increasing transparency in the use of export 
licenses. This proposal suggested a notification procedure within the 60 days after 
the application of a measure. Furthermore, the proposal designated the Committee 
on market access as the responsible authority to ensure and monitor the 
implementation of this notification system.144  
On the other hand, the last revised draft negotiating text advocates for policy 
solution more focused in strengthening Articles XI:2(a) GATT and Article 12 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. Paragraph 172 of the text requires the members 
applying an export restriction in conformity with Article XI:2(a) GATT to notify it to 
the WTO within the 90 days following its imposition. Moreover, the paragraph 176 
entrusts the Committee on Agriculture with the surveillance of this system. 
Likewise, the paragraph 179 calls for export restrictions to last no longer than 12 
months and forbids the ones lasting for more than 18 months without the consent 
of the importers. Nevertheless, the draft text maintains paragraph 12.2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, which excludes food-importing developing countries.145 
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4.4.1. Non-Agricultural Market Access 
The discussion of new disciplines for export restrictions has also taken place in 
the Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations. 
In this forum, the European Union has been the most active actor and has urged 
the contracting parties for a more modern exports tax regime. The EU 
proposals have focused on controlling the use of export restrictions as a way to 
provide unfair advantages to domestic industries. 
In its 2006 Communication on a Negotiation Proposal on Export Taxes146, the 
European Union set the restraint of beggar thy neighbour policies as its main 
objective. Likewise, it underlined the crucial importance of increasing 
transparency and predictability in the use of export restraints.  
The proposal comprised a three way approach in order to respond to the 
different necessities of the negotiating parties. It built on a general prohibition 
of export duties for developed and developing countries, allowing no 
exceptions for the former and a limited number for the latter. In a third 
category, the proposal suggested to bind the existing levels of export taxes for 
least developed countries. The proposal also allowed this last group to define a 
list of products for which they wanted to retain the option of applying export 
duties. Article 3 of the annex detailed the criteria by which export taxes could 
have been maintained, i.e. they needed to been listed in schedules and to fulfill 
two conditions. Firstly, their validity was subject to their necessity, “in 
conjunction with domestic measures, to maintain financial stability, to satisfy 
fiscal needs, or to facilitate economic diversification and avoid excessive 
dependence on the export of primary products”147. Secondly, they had to avoid 
adversely affecting “international trade by limiting the availability of goods to 
WTO Members in general or by raising world market prices of any goods beyond 
the prices that would prevail in the absence of such measures, or otherwise 
cause serious prejudice to the interests of developing country Members.” 
Additionally, Article 7 of the annex stressed the importance of the existing 
obligations on transparency and notification. 
The European Union proposed a more flexible approach in its 2008 Revised 
Submission on Export Taxes148. The communication maintained the stress in 
limiting beggar thy neighbour policies and increasing transparency and 
predictability. However, it eliminated the general ban on export duties and 
introduced a system based on notification and the development of schedules 
for export taxes.  
Even though these proposals had wide support in the developed world, they 
also faced strong opposition from developing countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil or Indonesia. In 2004, some developing countries produced an unofficial 
document which argued that the regulation of export restrictions did not fall 
under the scope of the Doha agenda and that negotiations of such a sensitive 
issue would need an explicit mandate by the parties.149 Indeed, the 2001 Doha 
Ministerial Declaration150 does not explicitly mention export restrictions. 
Nevertheless, it makes numerous references to the reduction of tariffs and the 
elimination of trade distorting measures. Therefore, it is possible to conclude 
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that there are sufficient legal arguments to believe that the negotiation of new 
disciplines on export restrictions is part of the Doha agenda. 
 
4.5. Regional Free Trade Agreements 
 
The WTO constituency has grown to 158 members from the 23 original signatories 
of the GATT agreement back in 1947. Although this expansion has had a very 
positive effect in the integration of global trade, it has also made negotiations 
much harder. 
Consequently, the world has seen a huge increase in the number of Regional Trade 
and Preferential Trading Agreements. From the low levels of the 80's, the number 
of agreements has soared six fold in two decades overpassing the 200.151  
Preferential Trade Agreements usually regulate export restrictions, proposing 
norms that suit their members better than the common WTO framework. 
Moreover, the reduced number of signatories eases the process of negotiation, 
making possible stronger commitments and originating alternative approaches to 
export restrictions regulation. Likewise, the more recent Free Trade Agreements 
are more up-to-date and reflect better the current challenges of international trade 
than the WTO regulation, which dates from 1994. 
A 2012 study conducted by researchers of the OECD152 analysed a sample of 93 
different free trade agreements. When comparing their provisions with the WTO 
discipline, the study found that 15 agreements contained tougher commitments 
when dealing quantitative export restrictions and 66 were stricter on their 
regulation of export taxes. 
 
4.5.1. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
The NAFTA framework includes norms that go further than the WTO 
commitments. On the one hand, the treaty incorporates Articles XI and XX 
GATT, but adds two complementary conditions to the application of the 
exceptions formulated in provisions XI:2(a), XX(g), XX(i) and XX(j) GATT to the 
general ban on quantitative export restrictions. Article 315 of the NAFTA’s final 
text153 details these complementary conditions. In the first place, it provides that 
the imposition of a quantitative restriction on a product would be valid “only if” 
it does not reduce de proportion made available to the other signatory parts 
over the total export shipments of that same product. The pre-existent 
proportion would be thus determined by analysing a sample of the trade flows 
in the previous 36 months. Secondly, Article requires that quantitative 
restrictions do not disrupt the “normal channels of supply” or the “normal 
proportions” in a list of specific product provided to the other parties.  
The regulation of the exceptions applicable to quantitative export restrains 
offered by NAFTA certainly proposes an interesting approach and is also used in 
other Free Trade Agreements such as Canada-Chile or Canada-Costa Rica.154 
On the other hand, Article 314 or the NAFTA allows the application of export 
tariffs only in a very restrictive way. In order to apply an export duty, the parties 
have to make sure that the same charge is imposed not only to other NAFTA 
members but also to their internal consumption. Furthermore, Article 315.1(b) 
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extends the control to licenses, fees, taxation, minimum prices or any other 
measures that may discriminate exports against internal consumption.  
Additionally, the Annex 314 of the agreement provides with an exception for 
Mexico to the general prohibition on export tariffs. Paragraph 4 of the provision 
establishes a list of “basic foodstuffs” that can be taxed. The annex defines as 
well a number of supplementary conditions to the applicability of the exception. 
Firstly, the export duties have to be applied to all the other parties. Secondly, it 
requires its application in the context of a domestic food assistance programme 
for national consumers, a stabilisation programme for the national industry or 
to relieve critical shortages of any foodstuff. In the last case, the provision limits 
the use of the exception to a period of one year, which can be extended by an 
agreement between the parties. 
As in the case of quantitative restrictions, the NAFTA regulation proposes a 
flexible approach for export duties. Instead of prohibiting tariffs, it creates a 
legal framework that offsets the risk of using the export taxes as a protective 
measure by imposing similar tariffs to exports and national consumption.155 
This flexibility is moreover evident in the exception granted to Mexico, which is 
a consequence of the divergent necessities of the developing and developed 
countries. 
 
 
4.5.2. The MERCOSUR 
The MERCOSUR funding text, the Asuncion agreement, contains provisions that 
propose a more complete regime than the WTO framework. Article 1 of the 
agreement establishes “the free movement of goods, services and factors of 
production between countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs 
duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any other 
equivalent measures”156. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Annex 1 of the same 
treaty provides that the parts shall eliminate any restriction once the common 
market is fully effective. However, the application of export tariffs in the intra-
MERCOSUR trade remains controversial. On the one hand, Argentina is a 
frequent user of export duties and argues that they do not distort the trade 
intra-MERCOSUR. On the other hand, Uruguay is opposed to these measures and 
advocates for a tighter control.157 
Furthermore, the vague language of the treaty complicates its application. The 
Ad Hoc Tribunal of the MERCOSUR has resolved in different cases that the 
principle of common market is effective from 1999 and that the provisions of 
the Asuncion agreement are directly applicable.158 However, export duties are 
still applied in intra-MERCOSUR trade by some of the signatories to the 
agreement.159 
Article 157.4 of the common Customs Code approved in 2010160 will place the 
national policies on export tariffs out of the reach of the MERCOSUR system, 
leaving the application of tariffs to the discretion of the member states. The 
code will enter into force once all the member states have ratified it.  
In treaties between the MERCOSUR block and its neighbour countries it is 
possible to appreciate the use of a standstill clause. Article 6 of the MERCOSUR-
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Chile161 agreement allows the existing export duties162 but prohibits the 
establishment of new taxes to exports or the increase of the existing ones. 
Article 6 of the MERCOSUR-Bolivia163 agreement and Article 6 of the MERCOSUR-
Peru164 agreement establish similar frameworks. As for the regime of 
quantitative restrictions, these agreements define a general elimination, but 
provide some exceptions adapted to the needs of the signatories. In the case of 
the MERCOSUR-Chile agreement, the text excludes the application of some of 
the General Exceptions of Article XX GATT, namely the XX(g), XX(i) and XX(j).165 
 
 
4.5.3. The European Union Free Trade Agreements 
The European Commission considers the regulation of the export restriction 
policies as a main concern of its trade policy, particularly in relation with the 
raw materials initiative166. The “Trade, Growth and World Affairs - Trade Policy as 
a core component of the EU's 2020 strategy”167 2010 communication defined the 
negotiation of more rigid disciplines of export restrictions in the trade 
agreements of the Union as one of the three initiatives that the European Union 
may pursue in order to fight the escalation of export restrictions. 
Therefore, the bilateral agreements signed by the European Union usually 
include provisions that limit to some extent the applicability of export 
restrictions. Analysing the more recent agreements of the Union it is possible to 
identify a group of treaties destined to neighbour countries. 
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Croatia is a clear example of 
this category. Its Article 20.2 imposes the elimination of “quantitative 
restrictions on exports and measures having equivalent effect”168. Likewise, it 
provides with a standstill clause for export tariffs in Article 33. However, Article 
42, named “Restrictions Authorised”, allows some exceptions to the general 
rule. The events considered in this article are similar to the ones listed in 
Articles XX and XI GATT. It justifies measures for reason of “public morality, 
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or 
archaeological value or the protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial 
property, or rules relating to gold and silver”169. Likewise, the last phrase of 
Article 42 of the Agreement proposes a “Chapeau Clause” similar to the one 
defined in the preamble of Article XX GATT.  
However, the 42 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement leaves out 
exceptions XX(d), XX(e), XX(g), XX(h), XX(i) and XX(j) GATT. It is particularly 
relevant the inapplicability of the conflictive subparagraph XX(g) GATT, which 
deals with the preservation of exhaustive natural resources.  
Similar provisions can be found in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
with Macedonia170, the Interim Agreement with Serbia171, Interim Agreement on 
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Trade and Trade-Related Matters with Bosnia and Herzegovina172, the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Montenegro173, the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement with Algeria174, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
with Egypt175, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Morocco176,  the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement with Jordan177 or the Interim Agreement on Trade and 
Trade-Related Matters with Lebanon178.  
It is possible to infer that this regime on quantitative export restrictions is used 
as a standard by the European Union to consolidate its trade relations with its 
neighbour partners. Therefore, the list includes mainly states acceding to the 
Union, candidates to admission or associates involved in the Union for the 
Mediterranean process.179  
Nevertheless, it is necessary to remark that some of the free trade agreements 
signed with the countries of the former Yugoslavia180 exclude the products listed 
in HS Chapters 1-24 together with the ones catalogued in the Annex 1 of the 
AoA. Moreover, the EC-Turkey agreement also leaves a number of agricultural 
products out of the quantitative export prohibition.181  Furthermore, these free 
trade agreements often contain an express ban on export duties. However, this 
ban is sometimes only applied to industrial goods, like is the case in the free 
trade agreements between the EU and Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia or 
Montenegro.182 In other occasions, the treaty excludes a list of agricultural 
products, like the agreements with Israel, Albania or Turkey.183 
Likewise, the European Union has concluded a wide range of bilateral 
agreements out of its neighbourhood policy.  
Firstly, the Free Trade Agreement with the Republic of South Korea184, which 
entered into force in 2011, establishes in its Article 2.9 a general prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions to exports. Moreover, Article 2.11 of the Free Trade 
Agreement provides a general ban on export duties as well. 
 The treaty incorporates the exceptions of Article XI and XX GATT. However, it 
proposes a different regime for the application of exceptions XX(i) and XX(j) 
GATT. As a result, the parties “shall supply the other Party with all relevant 
information, with a view to seeking a solution” before applying these 
exceptions. Only after 30 days without a satisfactory resolution, the party will 
be allowed to apply the exception. Additionally, this treaty admits precautionary 
measures before the period of 30 days in case of “exceptional and critical” 
situations. 
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The trade agreement with Central America, concluded as a part of the 
negotiations of an Association Agreement, proposes a similar framework for 
export restrictions. However, the Treaty grants a transitional period of 10 years 
for Guatemala’s and Costa Rica’s current export duties on bananas, beef and 
coffee185.  
In the same vein, the Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru186 contains a 
general prohibition of quantitative restrictions and export duties. Nonetheless, 
it lists a limited number of exceptions for products sensitive for Colombia such 
as emeralds and coffee187. 
For its part, the Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation with South 
Africa is one of the most developed out of the neighbourhood policy of the 
European Union. It bans the use of export duties and excludes the application 
of exceptions XX(d), XX(e), XX(h), XX(i) and XX(j) GATT.188 
Finally, the negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore, which 
were concluded in December 2012, proposed a tight regulation of export 
restrictions. The treaty, which is currently being drafted, is likely to propose a 
similar framework to the one applied in the treaty with South Korea. 
In addition, the regulation of export restrictions has also been a key issue in the 
ongoing negotiations of free trade agreements with Canada, India, Malaysia or 
MERCOSUR. Throughout these negotiations, the European Union has pursued 
the objective of full elimination of export duties on industrial raw materials.189 In 
fact, export restrictions are the main obstacle for the conclusion of the 
negotiations, which were suspended in 2010, between the European Union and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council190, composed by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
Furthermore, the European Union has addressed the issue of export restrictions 
in some of its non-preferential agreements, like the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Iraq191 or the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with Mongolia192.  
The Union has moreover concluded an ad hoc agreement with Russia to set a 
legal framework for the tariff-rate quotas applied to wood traded from Russia 
into the European Union193.  Likewise, in the context of the Russian accession to 
the WTO, the European Union concluded with Russia a bilateral set of rules 
which extended the commitments stipulated in the Accession Protocol194. 
According to Russia’s interpretation, the WTO Accession Protocol does not 
forbid the establishment of new export duties in products other than the ones 
listed in the schedule.  Consequently, the European Union concluded a bilateral 
agreement to prevent the establishment of new export duties by scheduling a 
number of products which are not listed in Russia’s WTO Schedule on Goods. 
The list of products contained in the Agreement is rather extent and covers raw 
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materials for which the EU has a major import interest, for which there is a risk 
of tension in global supplies or for which Russia controls a significant part of 
the global supply or production.195 
Nevertheless the language used to define the commitments undertaken by 
Russia is ambiguous and does not define strict obligations. By this agreement, 
Russia only commits to “make its best efforts” to avoid the introduction of new 
taxes on exports or increase the existing ones. In addition, the agreement 
establishes a consultation mechanism, binding Russia to consult with the 
European Union at least two months prior to the implementation of restrictive 
measures.196 
4.5.4. Other Preferential Trade Agreements 
There are numerous examples of free trade agreements that impose a general 
prohibition on export duties, with the exception of the cases where Article XX 
GATT applies, and establish punctual exceptions for specific products. That is 
the case of the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement-Dominican Republic 
agreement197 that allows Costa Rica to impose export duties in a list of products 
or the US-Colombia198 agreement, which permits Colombia to maintain export 
taxes on bananas and coffee.199 Likewise, the free trade agreement between the 
EFTA and Ukraine200 proposes a general ban on export duties, but details a list 
of exhaustible products that are excluded from the prohibition.201 
 
Other preferential trade agreements determine a general prohibition on export 
duties, but introducing situational exceptions instead of the product specific 
ones202. This is the case of the Common Economic Zone between Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This customs union presents a general ban to 
export taxes within the member states. However, the implementation of this 
provision has been intermittent.203  
 
The Japan-Mexico free trade agreement defines a strong regulation of export 
duties.204 Article 6 of the treaty sets a general prohibition on export taxes. 
Furthermore, the agreement limits the number of exceptions applicable to four 
of the General Exceptions of Article XX GATT, i.e. the protection of public 
morals, the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, the protection 
of intellectual property and the restrictions to prison labour. The agreement 
does not allow the use of export duties in the case of shortages or conservation 
of natural resources. In contrast, Article 7 and annex 2, which prohibit the 
adoption of quantitative export restrictions, provide an exception for a list of 
fuel related products. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the ASEAN agreement, together with the 
ASEAN-China and ASEAN-India agreements, only makes a reference to the 
existing commitments under the WTO system.205 
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5 Policy Proposal 
It is obvious that the existing export restrictions regime does not satisfy the necessities 
of the current international trading system. On the one hand, the WTO norms, while 
binding the level import duties, do not provide a substantial regulation for export 
taxes. This imbalance constitutes an important loophole that undermines international 
trade. On the other hand, the exceptions affecting the prohibition of quantitative 
export restrictions and the notification procedures are drafted in ambiguous terms and 
generate a situation of legal uncertainty. Therefore, it is clear that the members of the 
WTO need to consider the development of a more effective framework. 
The lack of reform of the multilateral legal regime leads countries to the 
implementation of measures that undermine the efficiency of the world trading system 
and reverses the global trade liberalisation process. This situation encourages 
protectionist attitudes, which are often counterproductive from a global welfare 
perspective.206  
Additionally, as indicated above, export taxes and quantitative export restrictions are 
substitutable policy tools. Therefore, it is inappropriate to strengthen the regulation on 
quantitative export restrictions without taking a decided action to discipline export 
taxes.207 
The Doha Development Round is jammed after 12 years of negotiations, so it is not 
reasonable to expect any big step at a multilateral stage in coming years. Furthermore, 
the proposals on the export restrictions regulation presented in the 2011 Ministers 
Conference received a cool response by a group of developing countries.208 As a result 
of this situation, most countries have turned to the negotiation of Regional or Bilateral 
agreements, which are easier to conclude and allow countries to further develop trade 
disciplines. In the last years, these preferential trade agreements have increasingly 
included provisions on export restrictions in order to complete or to define more 
precisely the WTO norms.209 The experience resulting of these agreements can have a 
positive influence in the development of a more effective export restrictions regime, 
since it may pave the way for a subsequent compromise at a multilateral level.210 
However, the proliferation of Regional and Bilateral trade agreements is in itself a 
challenge for the multilateral trading system. The complexity of these entrenched 
preferential practices increases the transaction costs for the businesses and 
complicates the enforcement of the acquired obligations.211 In addition, the conclusion 
of preferential trade agreements, by lowering trade barriers between the members, 
also causes a relative increase of the barriers for non-members.212 The conclusion of 
Regional and Bilateral trade agreements provokes thus that the excluded countries 
have to bear more instability and uncertainty in their local markets.213 
Hence, addressing the under-regulation of export restrictions by means of Regional 
and Bilateral agreements generates a sub-optimal situation from a global welfare point 
of view. The multilateral stage is thus the optimum forum for the discipline of export 
restrictions, even considering its limitations.214 
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In order to be effective, the design of the future regulation of export restrictions must 
provide flexibility in order to attend the legitimate concerns of the developing 
countries.215 Nevertheless, it must also aspire to completeness, providing homogeneous 
solutions insofar as reasonable. Considering the effects of export restrictions on 
international exchanges, the ultimate objective of this regulation should be a 
progressive reduction of the export rates and a noticeable limitation of quantitative 
restrictions to exports. 
It is unlikely that the developing countries will accept a drastic move in the multilateral 
scene, moving from a situation of wide discretion to a highly restrictive regime.216 Thus, 
the countries supporting stricter norms should focus their efforts in the short-term on 
containing the damaging consequences of export restrictions, while raising awareness 
over the negative consequences of these measures in order to achieve an effective 
regulation in the long-term.217 
Part 5 describes the solutions that this thesis proposes for the improvement of the 
notification processes, the application of quantitative export restrictions and the use of 
export duties. 
5.1. Notification Procedure 
 
As it was described above, the notification procedure established by Article 12 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture is strictly limited to a number of situations resulting 
from the application of the exception contained in Article XI:2(a) GATT. The more 
general notification regime of the 1993 Ministerial Decision on Notification 
Procedures covers a wider range of export restrictions. Both regulations are 
however broadly disregarded, offering little predictability of the implementation of 
export restrictions. Other information mechanisms like the Trade Policy Review 
reports of the WTO are likewise ineffective. The review process takes place every 
two to four years, and thus do not provide updated information.218 
As pointed out in the EU’s Doha Development Round proposals, the lack of 
transparency is extremely harmful for the confidence in the international trading 
system. Hence, it is necessary to ensure the respect of the existing notification 
regulations and to establish a more effective mechanism in a next stage. The 
improvement of the notification procedures, since does not entail an increase of 
the existing export restrictions disciplines, is less likely to generate a strong 
opposition from the group of developing countries.  
In its 2008 Revised Submission on Export Taxes, the European Union proposed a 
new system based on the existing Uruguay Round Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994, which establishes a working party that 
monitors in behalf of the Council for Trade of Goods. The Understanding also 
suggests a peer-review procedure, which allows the members to make a “counter-
notification” to the Council for Trade of Goods concerning the lack on notification 
of other members. In the same vein, a recent paper by Karapinar proposed the 
establishment of a Monitoring Committee composed by experts, which would 
regularly monitor and scrutinise the notification of the members. 
Even though these proposals improve the review mechanisms of the existing 
notification system, they fail to resolve the problem of enforcement in case of a 
repeated disregard of the norms. The issue does not have an easy solution. On the 
one hand, the Dispute Settlement Understanding seems somewhat inadequate to 
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deal with this sort of problems due to its long and costly proceedings. On the 
other hand, the WTO is not equipped with an alternative forum to address this sort 
of situations. 
The establishment of a standing monitoring body, in the form of a working party 
or a committee of experts, is certainly is a good first step.  In order to overcome 
the problem of the notification obligations’ disrespect, the parties could enhance 
the participation of the members in the monitoring proceedings through “counter-
notifications”. This measure could be complemented with the loss of the right to 
appear in front of the standing body in case of persistent contempt. By doing so, 
the parties could increase transparency and predictability and, at the same time, 
introduce a soft enforcement mechanism in the form of peer-pressure. The OECD 
has extensively used peer-review mechanisms for more than 40 years, proving 
them to be notably effective in compelling poor performers to bring their policies 
to the agreed levels.219 Following the current draft Doha texts, a new notification 
regulation should be built over Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture, de-
linking it from Article XI GATT and thus covering all forms of export restrictive 
measures.220 
5.2. Quantitative Export Restrictions 
 
As defined in Chapter 5, quantitative export restrictions are prohibited by Article XI 
GATT. However, the second paragraph of the same article provides a broad 
exception that limits its application. Likewise, the general prohibition is also 
limited by the general exceptions of Article XX GATT. 
In order to determine the appropriateness of these exceptions it is necessary to 
find a balance between the negative effects of export restrictions and the 
protection of the different social values that they protect, e.g. security, 
environment or public health. On the one hand, the provision of general 
exceptions is necessary. Even highly integrated trade blocks like the European 
Union establish some general exceptions. Nevertheless, the list of general 
exceptions of Article XX GATT was drafted more than 60 years ago and does not 
respond to the current needs of the international trading system. On the other 
hand, the existence of the exception of XI:2(a) GATT is also justified by the critical 
nature of food shortages. Countries need an instrument that allows them to 
protect the public interest in the case of emergency. Nevertheless, the ambiguous 
wording of this exception allows too much discretion, generating negative 
outcomes.221 The objective of the WTO parties should therefore be to limit the use 
of this exception. When a particular restriction does not respond to a “critical” 
situation, it should be thus covered by Article XX, which offers the complementary 
protection of the Chapeau Clause. 
In order to improve the effectiveness of the general prohibition of quantitative 
export restrictions it thus is necessary to refine the requirements for the 
application of these exceptions.  
The recent China – Raw Materials case, presumably the highest profile case in the 
field, provided some helpful clarifications on the use of Articles XI:2(a) and XX 
GATT. It successfully defined the dividing line between the application of the 
Articles XX(g) and XI:2(a) GATT exceptions to environmental problems. Likewise, it 
determined the inapplicability of Article XX GATT to the export duties schedules in 
China’s Accession Protocol. However, some of the defining terms of these 
exceptions remain unclear. In a recent article, Karapinar pointed out that the 
                                                
219 OECD 2007, p. 2. 
220 Sharma 2011, p. 23. 
221 Mitra and Josling 2009, p. 13.!
IES Working Paper 8/2013                             Jorge Torres Hidalgo  
 
 
  
45 
Appellate Body failed to define the concepts of “essential” product and “temporarily 
applied”, and that this situation causes legal uncertainty222. Evidently, it is possible 
that the WTO case law will develop these concepts in future resolutions. In fact, the 
Panel in the China – Raw Materials case required a “fixed time-limit” of the 
measures, but this interpretation was reversed by the Appellate Body.  
Notwithstanding the interpretation chosen by the Appellate Body, the WTO 
members should work for a more adequate regulation in the long-term. In the first 
place, it is necessary to provide a clear temporal limitation to the use of Article 
XI:2(a) GATT. Previous studies, i.e. Karapinar 2012; Korinek and Bartos 2012, have 
proposed to require fixed time periods for the implementation of restrictions. 
Moreover, as noted above, the last revised draft negotiating text in the Agriculture 
Negotiations of the Doha Development Round suggested a temporal limit of 12 
months. Certainly, the confinement of the export restrictions to a fixed time limit 
would likely bring a greater discipline to their implementation, limiting their 
application to “critical” situations.  
An alternative solution to the amendment of the WTO Agreements could be the 
adoption of an authoritative interpretation in the sense of Article IX.2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement223. This legal instrument, which requires a three-fourths 
majority for its approval, would enable the Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council to define the concept of “temporarily applied” in a more restrictive way. In 
this same vein, a ministerial decision in the form of a declaration was used in 2001 
to provide an agreed understanding on certain aspects of the TRIPS agreement, 
having similar effect to an authoritative interpretation.224   
In the second place, the members should agree on a more precise definition of 
“essential”. To this end, Korinek and Bartos suggested the establishment of a 
positive list of products in order to reduce the legal uncertainty. However, this 
approach does not take into account that, as Karapinar pointed out, the definition 
of “essential” products may evolve with time and economic development. 
Therefore, it is more adequate to propose specific benchmarks to define the 
essentialness of a given good. 
The proposals of the members during the Doha negotiations, as well as the 
provisions of the different preferential trade agreements signed in the last years, 
suggest limiting the use of export restrictions by establishing conditions to its 
implementation. The proposal submitted by Switzerland and Japan in the context 
the Agriculture Negotiations of the Doha Development Round advised the 
establishment of a consultation procedure supervised by a standing committee of 
experts. However, it is unlikely that this proposal will gain the support of the 
developing countries. The “proportionality” model formulated in the context of the 
NAFTA agreement is particularly relevant in this regard because it regulates a trade 
block that includes members with different levels of development, and should 
therefore provide better results.  A similar scheme based on proportionality was 
proposed by Japan in the context of the Agriculture Negotiations of the Doha 
Development Round.225 This model allows similar exceptions to the ones contained 
in the GATT, but it also provides a “proportionality” condition that focus on the 
protection of the importers.226 As a result, the framework remains flexible but 
offers better protection to the parts depending on the imports, eliminating to 
some extent the moral hazard of using restrictions to prioritise national 
production.  
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With regard to Article XX GATT, the study of the different Bilateral and Regional 
Free Trade agreements has indicated that some of the exceptions may not be 
appropriate nowadays. Korinek and Bartos indicated in a 2012 paper for the OECD 
that 32 over a sample of 76 Regional Free Trade Agreements limited the 
application of exception XX(j) GATT, and 29 restrained the use of the provision 
XX(i) GATT.227 Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the list of exceptions 
proposed by Article XX GATT needs to be updated, and that some of these 
provisions may be easily dispensable, particularly the XX(j) and XX(i) GATT. 
The situation of sub-paragraph XX(g) GATT, which refers to environmental 
protection, is particularly complex. On the one hand, this exception has been 
repeatedly used to justify anticompetitive behaviors. On the other hand, it 
responds to a legitimate concern of many developing countries, which consider 
export restrictive measures the only feasible way to effectively control 
environmentally harmful activities. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the WTO case law 
studies, in case by case basis, two criteria when determining the applicability of 
Article XX(g) GATT to a particular measure, i.e. its relation to conservation and that 
it is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic consumption. 
Karapinar proposed in its 2011 paper to complete these requirements. First, he 
suggested including an examination of the availability of less restrictive 
alternatives to the first criterion. Second, he recommended supplementing the 
“even-handedness” principle of the second criterion with an examination of the 
“feasibility” of the measure. However, a major weakness of this approach is that 
the assessment of the “feasibility” of a measure is already one of the examined 
elements in the “alternative measure” test applied to paragraph XX(b) GATT. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to include it in the “even-handedness” step. 
Nevertheless, the final intention of the proposal remains useful and makes the 
evaluation procedure more effective. Determining the “feasibility” of the alternative 
measures would help the Least Developed Countries, which often suffer from weak 
administrative capacities, to justify the protection of their environment by means 
of export restrictions. At the same time, it would complicate the use of exception 
XX(g) GATT to provide an unfair advantage to the domestic industry. 
5.3. Export Duties 
 
The under-regulation of export duties is probably the biggest shortcoming in the 
international discipline of export restrictions. Leaving aside their submission to the 
principles of Most Favoured Nation and Non-Discrimination, export duties can be 
freely applied by the members of the WTO. 
The use of countervailing measures to tackle this problem has already been 
rejected by a WTO Panel. Moreover, as explained in Section 4.1.6.2, the legal base 
for the use of these instruments is reduced. 
Quantitative export restrictions and export duties have a complementary character. 
Therefore, any discipline on export restrictions must tackle both sorts of measures 
to be meaningful.228 The different initiatives in the Doha Developing Round 
proposing a stricter regulation for export duties are not likely to be successful due 
to the strong opposition of some developing countries. However, the Members of 
the WTO should aspire to bind export taxes in the long term in order to guarantee 
the principle of liberal trade. In the recent years, some the developments have 
evidenced the need of a new regime that guarantees a more efficient framework of 
international trade. On the one hand, Accession Protocols and Regional Free Trade 
Agreements are progressively including export duties schedules. On the other 
                                                
227 Korinek and Bartos 2012, p. 30.!
228 Mitra and Josling 2009, p. 28. 
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hand, the WTO Secretariat in its 2006 Trade Policy Review on China criticised the 
use of export tax rebates for industrial policy purposes and suggested that they 
could be considered as an implicit subsidy. 
The countries proposing a stricter regime should therefore continue raising 
awareness on the negative effects of these measures and including provisions on 
this regard in their bilateral trade relations with a view to build consensus for next 
WTO rounds. In the long term, the WTO should pursue a negotiated phase out of 
export duties following the example of import duties scheduling. The negotiation 
of asymmetric schedules would guarantee the necessary flexibility to the system, 
ensuring fair conditions for developing countries. Moreover, the agreement could 
include longer transitional periods for least developed countries so they have more 
time to adapt their institutional structures as suggested in the EU Revised 
Submission on Export Taxes.  
In its 2011 paper, Karapinar proposed to take into account the composition of the 
international markets when defining these schedules. According to Karapinar, the 
negotiating parties should propose lower tariffs in markets which are oligopolistic 
in their supply. Likewise, he suggests imposing lower tariffs on countries which are 
monopoly suppliers of certain commodities than on smaller producers.229 This 
approach successfully points out that markets controlled by a short number of 
suppliers are more likely to develop unfair trade practices. However, the author 
fails to take into account that setting lower tariffs exclusively on monopoly 
suppliers would consistently disfavour big countries. Therefore, the optimal 
solution would be to impose the lower tariffs across the market in oligopolistic 
supply situations. 
Defining the adequate levels of export duties for agricultural products can be 
particularly conflictive. Export taxes have been traditionally used to offset the 
negative effects of international high prices in critical situations. Therefore, it is 
likely that countries will attempt to schedule high export rates for these products. 
However, the existence of pikes in the duties of agricultural products would allow 
the application of high export taxes beyond emergency situations, leading thus to 
protectionist behaviour. In order to offset the resistance to low rates of the 
developing countries two solutions can be proposed. On the one hand, the parties 
can refine the exception of Article XI:2(a) GATT to obtain an effective alternative to 
address emergency situations through quantitative restrictions. On the other hand, 
the parties can establish a variable export tax scheme as the one proposed by 
Sharma in a recent paper, which would link the permitted rates to the prices in the 
international markets.230 This model is the one used in the alternative calculation 
methods of the Russian WTO Accession Protocol. This system does not thwart the 
harmful effects of price escalation in international markets, but improves 
predictability and domestic price stability, and can thus be seen as a pragmatic 
transitional scheme.  
Additionally, Mitra and Josling proposed the creation of an “Exports Code” which 
would link an agreement on export taxes to concessions on export subsidies from 
the developed countries.231 However, an analysis of the appropriateness of this 
code falls out of the scope of this paper. 
Finally, it is important also to remember that a hypothetical regulation of export 
duties would be covered by the general exceptions of the WTO regime, which 
would provide further flexibility for developing countries. 
                                                
229 Karapinar 2011, p. 1151. 
230 Sharma 2011, p. 24.!
231 Mitra and Josling 2009, p. 28. 
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6 Conclusions 
Export restrictions to international trade are clearly under-regulated in WTO law. This is 
particularly pertinent if we consider that, as a form of market distortion, they lead to 
domestic and global welfare losses. 
 
At the same time, export restrictions are considered in some developing countries as a 
necessary instrument to pursue a number of public policy objectives: increasing tax 
revenue; promoting downstream industries; controlling local prices or enforcing 
environmental protection. 
 
In most cases, these measures take the form of quantitative export restrictions, export 
licences or export duties. 
 
In this regard, the WTO treaty evidences a lack of effective norms. In the first place, 
Article XI GATT establishes a general prohibition of quantitative export restrictions to 
trade. However, the wording of the applicable exceptions is unclear and the Appellate 
Body has not managed to fully clarify the legal uncertainty. Moreover, the existing 
notification obligations are widely disregarded by the WTO members. 
 
Some of the negotiating parties in the Doha Development Round have supported the 
establishment of a stricter legal framework. Nonetheless, an agreement has not been 
met and export restrictions have been pulled out of the negotiating process. 
 
As a result, countries have turned to the establishment of improved regimes in the 
context of bilateral and regional preferential agreements. Likewise, more rigid 
provisions have been imposed upon some of the most recent members in their 
Accession Protocols. 
 
Nevertheless, these approaches have proved to have their own shortcomings, and the 
multilateral stage continues to be the most appropriate forum for the achievement of 
an effective solution. To this end, the negotiating parties should agree on a 
homogeneous framework that also provides the flexibility required by the developing 
countries. 
 
A new legal framework should start by increasing transparency in the application of 
export restrictions, enforcing the existing obligations and improving the monitoring 
mechanisms by establishing a responsible standing body. This should be completed by 
enhancing the role of the peer-review mechanisms. Moreover, an appropriate discipline 
for export restrictions should clearly define the scope of the exception contained in 
Article XI:2(a) GATT, requiring certain temporal limits and defining benchmarks for the 
concept of “essential”. Furthermore, it should also include the examination of 
alternative feasible measures to the determination of the applicability of the 
environmental exception of Article XX(g) GATT. Finally, an effective framework should 
propose a phasing-out of export duties following the example of import duties. In 
order to provide the necessary flexibility, the system should furthermore consider the 
application of asymmetric schedules and transitional periods. 
 
Multilateral consensus in these fields will not be reached easily and it will certainly not 
be attained in the short-term. Nevertheless, the rest of the alternatives do not provide a 
better solution. Without a decisive reform, the number of trade conflicts related to 
export restrictions will increase and the subsequent political tensions will be 
aggravated. 
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